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IMMIGRATION AS URBAN POLICY
Rick Su*
ABSTRACT

Immigration has done more to shape the physical and social landscape of
many of America's largest cities than almost any other economic or cultural force. Indeed, immigration is so central to urban development in the
United States that it is a wonder why immigration is not explicitly discussed as an aspect of urban policy. Yet in the national conversation over
immigration, one would strain to hear it described in this manner. This essay addresses this oversight by making the case for a reorientation of immigration toward urban policy; and it does so by advocating for an immigration regime that both explicitly recognizes the role of immigration as an
instrument of urban development, and sees urban policy as a vital complement to our federal immigration regime. As this essay outlines, there are
good reasons for such an urban policy reorientation from the perspective of
both urban and immigration policymakers. At the same time, significant
obstacles exist, not only in the structure of our immigration laws, but also
the prevailing organization of our local governments. Thus, the essay concludes by proposing a reform to our immigration regime that advances the
aims of reorienting immigration toward urban policy, addresses the structural obstacles that stand in the way, and suggests further avenues of reform
going forward.
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INTRODUCTION

Immigration has done more to shape the physical and social landscape of
many of America's largest cities than almost any other economic or cultural force. Its effect on established immigration gateways is clear: New York
City, a traditional reception area for newcomers to the United States, continues to be an ever-shifting palette of immigrant neighborhoods and crossethnic interactions;' Los Angeles, with an Anglo population of more than
seventy percent in the 1970s,2 is now both derisively and admiringly called
the "Capital of the Third World"; 3 Miami, with its large number of Latino
residents and concentration of Cuban financiers, embraces its demographic
makeup not only as a source of cultural pride, but also in its bid as the financial gateway to Latin America. 4 At the same time, interest in immigration is quickly spreading to other metropolitan regions as well. With the
immigrant population soaring in "boomtown" cities like Las Vegas, Houston, Dallas, and others in the Sun Belt,5 the impact of immigration on the
newest wave of urban development seems to parallel the immigrant-driven
urbanization of earlier eras. All the while, immigration is drawing attention
in regions without significant immigration inflows at all; many Rust Belt
cities like Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Detroit have raised the prospect of
6
immigration as an urban revitalization strategy.

. Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo Law
School; B.A.,
Dartmouth College, J.D., Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Gerald Frug for helpful
and insightful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See NANCY FONER, NEW IMMIGRANTS INNEW YORK 16 (rev. ed. 2001).
2. See ERIC AVILA, POPULAR CULTURE IN THE AGE OF WHITE FLIGHT: FEAR AND FANTASY INSUBURBAN Los ANGELES 230 (Earl Lewis et al. eds., 2006).
3. See generally DAVID RIEFF, Los ANGELES: CAPITAL OF THE THIRD WORLD (1991).
4. See AKE E. ANDERSSON & DAVID E. ANDERSSON, GATEWAYS TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 139-41 (2001).
5. See, e.g., D'Ann Petersen & Laila Assanie, The ChangingFace of Texas: Population ProjectionsandImplications, in THE FACE OF TEXAS: JOBS, PEOPLE, BUSINESS, CHANGE
37 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall. ed., 2005), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/

pubs/fotexas/fotexas_petersen.html; AUDREY SINGER, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE RISE OF
NEW IMMIGRANT GATEWAYS (2004).
6. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., LOCAL ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT
DEVELOPMENT, FROM IMMIGRATION TO INTEGRATION: LOCAL SOLUTIONS TO A GLOBAL

CHALLENGE 87 (2006) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION TO INTEGRATION]; Barry Newman, Feeling
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Indeed, immigration appears to be so central to urban development in the
United States that it is a wonder why immigration is not explicitly discussed as an aspect of urban policy. Yet in the national conversation over
immigration, one would strain to hear it described in this manner. Despite
the significant impact of immigration on our metropolitan regions and the
importance of urban development to this nation's social and economic
prosperity, there is still a distinct sense that urban interests are one step below the "national" concerns that guide the development of immigration
laws. If there is any room for a local role, it is often discussed as an extension of the federal government's existing enforcement efforts. 7 If there is
it is usually in the context of how they
any consideration of local concerns,
8
interests.
national
with
conflict
This essay addresses this oversight by making the case for a reorientation of immigration toward urban policy.9 It does so by advocating for an
immigration regime that both explicitly recognizes the role of immigration
as an instrument of urban development, and sees urban policy as a vital
complement to our federal immigration regime. In Part III, I lay out a preliminary proposal along these lines by calling for the geographic allocation
of certain immigration visas according to regional needs, interests, and federal-local negotiations. This, I argue, would be a modest yet significant
step toward integrating our national immigration regime with urban development in this country.
The discussion preceding Part III establishes the groundwork for why
such a proposal, and other efforts along the same lines, are sensible and
feasible. In Part I, I set forth the reasons why an urban policy reorientation
makes sense both from the perspective of urban policymakers, for whom
immigration is an important issue and a useful tool, and immigration policymakers, given the influence of urban policies on our nation's capacity to
J., May 28, 2003, at B 1; STEvE TOBOC(2010), available at http://neweconomyinitiative.
cfsem.org/resources/research-library/global-detroit-study.
7. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The QuintessentialForce Multiplier: The Inherent Authority ofLocal Policeto Make ImmigrationArrests, 69 ALB. L. REv. 179, 181 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Howard Fischer & Brady McCombs, U.S. Suit Jacks Up Drama Over ImmigrationLaw, ARIz. DAILY STAR, July 7, 2010, at Al.
9. One note on the use of the word "urban" in this essay might be useful. As a matter
of geography, I use "urban" in a manner similar to its use in the Census to refer to geographic areas encompassing a distinct and interconnected economic and social network, which,
when involving a metropolitan region, includes the central city, the suburbs, and even the
exurban fringe. See Census 2000 Urban and Rural Classification,U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/ua/ua 2k.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2009). As a matter of
politics, I focus my attention primarily on metropolitan regions because they reflect the fundamental urban unit today and, as such, are in the best position to make urban policy decisions, including those involving immigration.

Snubbed by Immigrants, PittsburghActs,
MAN, GLOBAL DETROIT: SHORT REPORT

WALL ST.
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absorb immigrants and the long-term effect of immigration on our country.
Part II then outlines two obstacles to treating immigration as urban policy
under the existing legal structure: the absence of any direct means in existing immigration law to accommodate regional variations and interests, and
the lack of any structure in current local government law to allow for urban
policymaking at the regional level with respect to immigration. With this
as background, the proposal in Part III aims to advance the goals set forth
in Part I, while addressing the obstacles posed in Part II.
I. THE REASONS FOR IMMIGRATION AS URBAN POLICY

A.

Why Immigration Should Matter to Urban Policymakers

Immigration matters to urban policymakers for the simple reason that
immigration is, and has always been, a critical part of the growth and development of the American city.10 This was true for the great cities of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whose urbanization was disproportionately fueled by the first major waves of immigration. It is also true
today, as cities and metropolitan regions work to manage the new immigrants they have received. Yet the significance of immigration to urban
policy lies not only in its past and present impact, but also, more importantly, in how it affects a city's future prospects. Indeed, in an environment
marked by increasing inter-local competition, it is worth noting that the
ability to channel and manage immigration is central to many different urban development strategies.
As a historical matter, immigration has always been a particularly urban
phenomenon. Immigrants to the United States have long been drawn to urban centers in higher proportions than the native populations, and periods
of rapid urbanization in the United States have tended to coincide with periods of mass immigration. 1' During the rise of the great American cities in
the late-nineteenth century, two-thirds of immigrants were residents of a
city as compared to only one-third of all Americans.1 2 In cities like Boston, Baltimore, and Chicago, immigrants constituted anywhere from one-

10. See THOMAS MULLER, IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN CITY 69 (1993).
11. See, e.g., ROGER DANIELS, COMING To AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
ETHNIcITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 185 (1990); MULLER, supra note 10, at 304; JAMES P. SMITH
ET AL., THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 31 (1997).

12.
STATES

KENNETH

70 (1985).

T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS

FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
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third to one-half of the total population. 13 Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, it is estimated that four out of five residents in the greater
New York area were either foreign-born or had a foreign-born parent.1 4 As
laborers and entrepreneurs, immigrants have played a critical role in the
development of the economic and physical infrastructure of the modem
American city.15 Moreover, as constituents and public servants, their involvement in local democracy has also shaped the political foundations of
urban governance.' 6 To be sure, this history is not one without controversy
and conflict: tensions festered between unions and strikebreakers, 17 between "Yankee-controlled" state houses and immigrant-supported city
halls, 18 and on the streets where the ills of urbanization and immigration
were seen as mutually reinforcing and in need of reform.' 9 Yet even this
darker side reveals the deep historic interconnections between immigration
and urbanization in the United States.
Suburbanization, deindustrialization, and political fragmentation have
radically altered the urban landscape of the early twentieth century. But
with nearly eighty percent of the United States population living in "urbanized areas" in or around a central city, ° and with metropolitan economies
constituting the bulk of our nation's economic output, 21 urban development
is arguably more important today than at any other time in American history. Since the liberalization of immigration in 1965,22 immigration is also
once again playing a role. Indeed, anecdotes abound of how immigration is
fast-changing the physical and social fabric of the urban landscape.2 3 As
many cities began to emerge from decades of depopulation and decline in
the 1990s, some began to attribute their near-miraculous recoveries to the
13. See CAMPBELL GIBSON & KAY JUNG, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1850 TO 2000, at 143-48 (2006); MALDWYN ALLEN JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRA-

TION 100 (1965).
14. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE RISE OF THE CITY 1878-1898, at 73 (1933).
15. See, e.g., MULLER, supra note 10, at 74-76.

16. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE
1870-1900, at 6-7, 180-87 (1984).

UNHERALDED TRIUMPH: CITY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA:

17. See VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN UNIONISM 24-25 (2001).
18. See, e.g., LAWRENCE W. KENNEDY, PLANNING THE CITY UPON A HILL: BOSTON SINCE

1630, at 121 (1994).
19. See, e.g., PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920,
at 169, 205 (1978).
20. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2007, at
33 (2006).
21. See Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, andthe Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1107 (2008).
22. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
23. See, e.g., FONER, supranote 1, at 17.
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massive growth of immigration taking place around the same time.2 4 All
the while, the immigrant population has been quickly increasing in almost
all of America's fastest growing cities: the foreign-born population is almost 30% in Dallas and Houston, more than 25% in Phoenix, and 13% in
Charlotte. 25 Indeed, population growth in the largest twenty-five cities has
26
been disproportionately driven by foreign-born residents in recent years.
With these demographic trends, it is not surprising that metropolitan regions today are facing similar sets of immigration-related issues as those of
American cities at the turn of the twentieth century, from educating immigrant children, to the cultural and political struggle over community identity. Yet if immigration is of interest to urban policymakers, it is not simply
because of the impact of immigration itself. The ongoing refinement of our
national immigration laws is also having an effect. This is particularly true
given that our immigration regime has steadily expanded beyond admission
quotas and entry requirements at the border toward "soft controls" focused
on a more subtle balancing of incentives and deterrents through various aspects of domestic policy as applied to immigrants. Examples include the
adjustments to immigrant eligibility for social services in 1996,27 which
immediately made immigrants a more risky and costly population, 28 and
29
the expansion of immigration consequences for criminal convictions,
which is starting to cast a long shadow over state interests in criminal proceedings. 30 It is also worth noting the local impacts associated with federal

24. See RICHARD T. HERMAN & ROBERT L. SMITH, IMMIGRANT, INC.: WHY IMMIGRANT
ENTREPRENEURS ARE DRIVING THE NEW ECONOMY (AND HOW THEY WILL SAVE THE AMERICAN WORKER) 118-21 (2009); MULLER, supra note 10, at 304; ORG. FOR ECON. CoOPERATION & DEv., IMMIGRANTS, INTEGRATION AND CITIES: EXPLORING THE LINKS 19
(1998).
25. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NATIVITY AND PLACE OF BIRTH OF RESIDENT POPULATION-25

LARGEST CITIES: 2007, available at http://www.census.gov/compendialstatab/20l0/tables/
10s0041 .pdf.
26. See id.
27. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, §§ 400-45 1, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260-76 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
28. This is especially true given that almost all states reinstated benefits to immigrants
by tapping into state and local coffers. See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?
Devolution of the ImmigrationPower,EqualProtection,andFederalism,76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
493, 515 (2001).
29. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power,56 AM. U. L. REv. 367, 381-85 (2006).
30. NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, AMERICA'S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS:

THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 43-44 (2009), availableat

http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/665b5fa3 If96bc408
52574260057a81 f/$FILE/problem-solvingreportl 10409_629(K+PMS3145).pdf (describ-
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immigration enforcement efforts such as workplace raids 3 1 and neighbor32
hood sweeps.
With respect to why immigration matters to urban policymaking, however, even more important than the past and present impact of immigration
is how it plays into the future trajectory of urban development. In other
words, immigration is not just something that happens to cities or something to which cities must respond--each of which cast cities in a passive
light. As the purpose of urban policy is increasingly being directed toward
weighing and pursuing different urban development strategies, it is worth
noting that the management and channeling of immigration at the local level plays a significant and useful role.
The importance of immigration in this regard is due in part to the changing role of urban policymaking. Instead of just focusing on present demands, urban policymakers are increasingly oriented toward future prospects. On the one hand, this is because of lingering uncertainties about
traditional models of urban development. If the crisis of cities in the midtwentieth century demonstrated anything, it was that the long-term health
and viability of any city-region depends on its ability to adapt, reorient, and
sometimes wholly reinvent itself.3 3 On the other hand, the forward-looking
orientation is the result of growing awareness about the vast potential of
new urban forms. Indeed, even as the traditional industrial- and transportation-related rationales for urban agglomeration declined in relevance, the
urban resurgence of the late twentieth century introduced a new set of
models that emphasized different aspects of the modem city. As Gerald
Frug and David Barron repurposed as "city futures," urban commentators
in recent decades have focused attention on the many different trajectories
of urban development: the Global City, 34 the Creative City, 35 the Tourist
City,36 and the Regional City, 37 to name but a few. 38 To be sure, there is no

ing how immigration consequences are affecting the operations of alternative rehabilitation
programs now gaining favor at the state level).
31. See Yvonne Abraham, PatrickSays PromisesBroken on Raid: Access Disputed on
Immigrants, Bos. GLOBE, Mar. 15, 2007, at Al; Robin Shulman, Immigration Raid Rips
Families;Illegal Workers in MassachusettsSeparatedfrom Children,WASH. POST, Mar. 18,
2007, at A6.
32. See Nina Bernstein, Officials ProtestAntigang Raids Focusedon Immigrants,N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at B3; Milton J. Valencia, Activists Protest Federal GangRaids: Say
Sweeps Are Too Broad andHeavy-Handed,BoS. GLOBE, Aug. 9, 2008, at B2.
33. See Edward Glaeser, Reinventing Boston: 1630-2003, 5 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 119,
151 (2005).
34. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO
(2001).
35. See generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS (2002).

36. See generallyTHE TouRIST CITY (Dennis R. Judd & Susan S. Fainstein eds., 1999).
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shortage of disagreement on the costs and benefits that come with pursuing
any particular model or combination of models.3 9 Yet in an increasingly
mobile world, even the most successful cities seem to realize the importance of keeping an eye on alternative futures.
From this perspective, it is not surprising that immigration is starting to
attract the attention of urban policymakers today. Immigration can not only be used to advance many of these different models of urban development, but can also affect the prospects of these futures in a variety of different ways. For example, the potential impact of immigration may be
direct and focused on the contribution of the immigrants themselves. Whereas one city may be interested in immigration as a means of recruiting
specific professionals to advance a Global City or Creative City agenda
(geared towards international finance and high-tech innovation, respectively), another may be interested in immigration flows generally as a way to
stabilize a population base or spur growth. Alternatively, the intended impact of an immigration strategy may be indirect-not necessarily focused
on the immigrants themselves, but on how their presence may enhance the
ability of the city to attract others. The diversity, vibrancy, and cosmopolitanism that comes with having an ever-changing set of immigrant communities may be an amenity sought out by individuals who can contribute to the
city in other ways. Similarly, the ability of a city to manage immigration
may serve as a signaling function of its tolerance to other groups it may
wish to attract. Moreover, just like the models of city futures themselves,
the impact of immigration may be complementary or at cross-purposes. A
city promoting immigrant entrepreneurship in pursuit of a Middle Class
City, may in turn spur a set of vibrant ethnic communities that both attract
skilled co-ethnics in service of its Creative City ambitions and serve as an
urban attraction to enhance its Tourist City 40 status. Contrast this with a
city that relies on low-skilled immigrant labor to meet the service demands
of a Global City, but in turn exacerbates income polarization to the frustration of Middle Class City advocates.
There is also another benefit to considering the role of immigration
through these concrete sets of city futures: they give substance and meaning to what can sometimes be a vague and unmoored conversation about
immigration policy. To be sure, the immigration debate is supposed to be a

37. See generally PETER CALTHORPE & WILLIAM B. FULTON, THE REGIONAL CITY:
PLANNING FOR THE END OF SPRAWL (2001).

38. See GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND 141-229 (2008).
39. See id.at 24-26.
40. See generally THE TOURIST CITY, supranote 36.
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41
conversation about the identity of the nation and our vision of its future.
Yet, the vast size of our nation and the sheer diversity of our different regions combine to make this discussion nearly unmanageable. It is no wonder the immigration discourse at the national level is often simply reduced
to two broad camps-one pro-immigration, one anti-immigration-from
which important and detailed questions about legalization, immigration quotas, and visa categories are supposed to be answered. City futures, however, offer a different vocabulary for giving our preferences and ideas
shape in the immigration conversation: What model of our community do
we wish to pursue, and what role can or should immigration play?

B.

Why Urban Development Should Matter to Immigration
Policymakers

The profound effect that immigration has had on the past, present, and
future development of the American city is one reason why immigration
should be recognized as an important part of urban policy in America. It
explains why cities should care about immigration. But given that immigration is largely a national issue and a federal responsibility, why should
federal immigration policymakers be concerned about urban policy? This
section offers two reasons: first, immigration controversies are often local
in scope and inextricably linked to the manner in which we have organized
our cities and metropolitan regions; second, urban policy underlies two major considerations of immigration policymaking.
At the most basic level, urban policy is important because the immigration debates revolve around traditionally local issues. To be sure, I do not
intend to dismiss the real consequences that immigration poses to quintessentially national matters such as foreign affairs, international trade, or, in
extreme scenarios, national sovereignty. 42 The reality, however, is that in
contrast to these internationally-oriented considerations, the motivations
behind most immigration reform proposals are overwhelmingly local. Indeed, once one moves past the largely symbolic concerns about legality and
the rule of law, the arguments surrounding immigration reform start to resemble those that might be raised to advocate for a new urban policy agenda. The issue of immigration today is too often reduced to a grand discus-

41. See KEITH A. FITZGERALD, THE FACE OF THE NATION: IMMIGRATION, THE STATE, AND
THE NATIONAL IDENTITY 23 (1996).
42. See Randall C. Archibold, Law in Arizona Is Causing Split In Border Talks, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2010, at Al; see also ANDREW GYORY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS,
AND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT 154-56 (1998) (describing the diplomatic controversies
associated with immigration restrictions in California and the negotiations leading to the
Chinese Exclusion Act).
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sion of border fences and National Guard deployment when most people
are mainly concerned about the permeability of their neighborhoods and
the numbers and type of students enrolled at their children's school district.
We parse endlessly the origins and characteristics of those involved in the
"new" wave of immigration, when much of the actual reasons for doing
so
are familiar domestic issues connected to segregation and concentrated poverty-whether we refer to them as ghettos, slums, or barrios. The same
goes for our tendency to talk about immigration and crime through the lens
of international criminal syndicates when so often the actual concerns are
policing, safe neighborhoods, and the wayward life trajectory of all-tooassimilated-youths. Additionally, as sentiments over immigration are increasingly tied to such issues as housing, traffic congestion, and neighborhood transitions,4 3 it is sometimes hard to distinguish complaints about
immigration from complaints about urban life. Indeed, that may be the
point: the challenge of immigration policymaking today may be that we are
increasingly turning to it to address urban policy issues to which it is not
well-suited.
From this perspective, immigration policyrnakers should be concerned
about urban development because it establishes the background context
from which immigration controversies arise. But the argument that I wish
to make here is not simply that all politics is local, including those involving immigration. Indeed, even from a purely national perspective, urban
policies are still independently important to the issue of immigration. The
reasons for this, I argue, can be drawn from the influence of urban policy
on two basic aspects of how immigration policies are made. First, urban
policy directly affects our nation's physical and, more importantly, cultural
44
capacity to accept and integrate foreigners into American society.
Second, the consequences of urban policies have a strong influence on the
long-term effect of immigration on our country.
In setting immigration policy, it is common to assume that our nation's
capacity to absorb and integrate immigrants is relatively constant, and thus
the goal of immigration policy is to discover that limit and set immigration
rates accordingly. This capacity is sometimes talked about in terms of

43. See Editorial, Blaming Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2000, at A18 (describing
Federation Against Immigration Reform's media campaign linking immigration to sprawl);
see also Carl F. Horowitz, Housing "Shortages": The Immigration Dimension,
VDARE.coM (Dec. 4, 2004), http://www.vdare.com/horowitz/041221_housing.htm; Traffic
Congestion, FED'N FOR IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=
iic-immigrationissuecenters64c I (last updated Mar. 2003).
44. Cf Christina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in ImmigrationRegulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 581 (2008) (arguing that integration should be the focus of the
state and local role with respect to immigration).
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physical infrastructure and economic demand. More important, however,
seems to be our nation's capacity to integrate immigrants and our society's
ability to tolerate them.45 Not only is this so-called "cultural" capacity often at the center of political debates, but communitarian theorists like
Walzer and liberal theorists like Ackerman, among others, emphasize it in
their assessment of the principles of immigration control.4 6
As urban scholars suggest, however, not only may this cultural capacity
be more malleable than commonly assumed, but it might also be a direct
result of how urban policies have organized our communities and structured personal relations. It is not just how infrastructure decisions are made
or how local economic politics are fashioned, as important as these are. It
is also how urban policies shape our cultural attitudes about diversity and
our ability to manage and resolve conflict as a community. In this regard,
what is important is the extent to which the organization of our neighborhoods and the features of our local laws enhance or stifle our capacity to
tolerate, accommodate, or even enjoy "otherness" in our daily lives-an
attribute that Richard Sennett refers to as "ego strength" and Gerald Frug
calls "community building." 4 7 In short, the types of urban policies that we
adopt influence not only our physical capacity to absorb immigration, but
also our cultural capacity to adapt and reach out.
From this perspective, it is worth noting then that even if ego strength
and community building suit our ideals of America as an immigrant nation,
urban policies in the twentieth century have been decidedly oriented in the
opposite direction. Without going into all of the details, suffice it to say
that legal structures and policy choices have had a role in shaping the contemporary metropolitan landscape, which for most Americans continues to
be defined by persistent segregation, inequality of services, intra-regional
conflict, and a clear spatial hierarchy. 48 Not only does this structure define
our social relationships and daily routines, but it also affects how we approach issues of public policy. Our crime control strategy still largely focuses on the isolation of certain neighborhoods and the exclusion of certain
individuals, 49 while conflict resolution is geared primarily towards avoidance and exit, rather than engagement and voice. 50 We closely guard our
45. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? 221-56 (2004) (discussing the dual importance of Mexican immigrants assimilating into American culture and America's ability
to integrate immigrants).
46. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE INTHE LIBERAL STATE 93-95 (1980); Mi-

CHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 3 8-39 (1983).
47.
48.
49.
50.

GERALD E. FRUG, CITYMAKING 115-22 (1999).
See id.at 3-4.
See id.at 196.
See M.P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL ORDER OF A SUBURB 11 (1988).
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communities and schools from the possibility of invasion and feel entitled,
if not obligated, to assess potential newcomers with an eye toward their
overall fiscal impact on the municipal treasury or our property values.51
Considering that these are some of the cultural characteristics that urban
policies have fostered in the past several decades, the fact that similar sentiments and strategies are echoed in the realm of immigration policymaking
might not be coincidental.
Another aspect of immigration policymaking that is influenced by urban
policy decisions is the question of immigrant effects. Immigration policies
have long focused on immigrant characteristics such as their education, job
skills, and origins as a way of predicting what effect their admission will
have on American society. This is why our immigration regime is an alphabet soup of visa qualifications pegged to numerical quotas and detailed
schedules.
But while the attention has been directed at the characteristics of the
immigrants that we let in, far less consideration has been paid to the economic and social environment they face once they arrive. Indeed, we are
often far more likely to attribute immigrant outcomes to individual characteristics than to structural factors, which then feeds back into demands for
more refined quotas. Whether high-skilled immigrants find a way to contribute to the best of their abilities or low-skilled immigrants find a path of
upward mobility, entrepreneurship depends as much on individual drive
and broader economic forces as it does on community support, local economic integration, and the geography of opportunity. 52 Even more important are the prospects of the second generation, which sets the trajectory for
immigration's long-term effects. 53 As sociologists have aptly pointed out,
assimilation for immigrant newcomers can be upwards toward the middle
class or downwards toward an underclass. 54 In measuring the long-term
effects of immigration then, the segmented paths of assimilation that urban
policy has thus far helped to create should be as much a consideration as
national origin or parents' education level.
The point here is not to suggest that immigrant characteristics do not
provide a rough proxy for immigrant effects-they do. Nor is it to suggest
51. Rick Su, Local Fragmentationas Immigration Regulation, 47 Hous. L. REv. 367,
378-83 (2010).
52. See generallyXavier N. de Souza Briggs, More Pluribus,Less Unum? The Changing Geography of Race and Opportunity,in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY 17 (Xavier
N. de Souza Briggs ed., 2005).
53. See PHILIP KAsiNrrZ ET AL., INHERITING THE CITY: THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS
COME OF AGE 1-2 (2008).

54. See, e.g., Alejandro Portes & Min Zhou, The New Second Generation: Segmented
Assimilation andlts Variants,530 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 74, 74-76 (1993).
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that an urban policy that maximizes the benefits of immigration while reducing its costs is easily designed or implemented; considering the history
of initiatives addressing similar urban issues, such as the consequences of
racial segregation and inequality, the answer is certainly no. Yet both are
considerations that should properly be accounted for in policy choices and
public discourse in the immigration and urban policy contexts. For immigrants (and others), cities can be and have been incredible engines for social and economic mobility. To the extent that this and other avenues for
advancement are foreclosed, it may be in the national or urban interest to
refime immigration quotas downward and step up enforcement. But in
doing so, we should not be blind to the role of urban policies on the immigration effects that we calculated, or the potential upsides that may have
been lost as a result.
II. THE LEGAL LIMITS TO IMMIGRATION AS URBAN POLICY

As the foregoing shows, there are good reasons why urban policy should
play a much larger role with respect to immigration. Immigration is too
useful a tool for urban development to be ignored in urban policymaking.
Moreover, because urban policy influences so much of our nation's perspective on immigration, it would be a shame not to foreground it in this
manner. Notwithstanding these reasons, this Part argues that there are two
major obstacles to employing immigration as urban policy in this manner.
First, there is currently no legal avenue for regional variation or local control with respect to immigration. Second, as they are currently organized,
there are legitimate concerns about whether metropolitan regions-the unit
best suited to urban policymaking in America today-are capable of designing an urban immigration policy, even with strictly their own interests
in mind. Both of these will be outlined in more detail below. Before that,
however, it is worth explaining why none of these obstacles are constitutional in nature.
A.

Why Federal Preemption is No Obstacle

There are significant obstacles to the integration of immigration into urban policy, but the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over immigration and the doctrine of federal preemption are not among them. Given
the myriad legal challenges against state and local efforts to regulate immigration, such as the ones in Arizona,55 this position might seem surprising.

55. See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009)
(challenging Legal Arizona Workers Act), cert. grantedsub noma.Chamber of Commerce v.
Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010); United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 980 (D. Ariz.
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Indeed, considering how easily all of the current legal controversies map
onto the familiar conflict between federal power and state rights, one may
suppose that the prospects of steering immigration toward an explicit recognition of urban policy would depend foremost on how the scope of federal and state power are defined through the preemption doctrine, and what
that says about the relative balance of federal and state interests with respect to immigration.
Yet, despite the enormous attention on the immigration front, these legal
issues actually matter a lot less to an urban policy reorientation than one
might think. The reason for this is twofold. First, there is no inconsistency
between federal control and urban policy, just as there is no necessary connection between state rights and urban interests. Second, any initial baseline allocation of power does not preclude subsequent delegation or cooperation. It is worth noting then that urban issues-particularly those
involving housing and economic development-have long been areas of
federal involvement, and the federal government has at times aggressively
sought to influence the development of urban policies as a matter of national interest. 5 6 In this light, to say that immigration is an exclusive federal issue does not necessarily mean that immigration policy cannot be fashioned with an explicit urban policy component or implemented without a
local role. At the same time, although state governments are often well positioned to effectuate urban policy, they have not always considered it a
matter of priority or approached it with urban interests in mind.57 Thus, a
narrow reading of the federal government's occupation of the immigration
field under preemption may reflect a state victory over federal control, but
may itself mean very little for an urban policy agenda.
With respect to the prospects of immigration as urban policy then, what
is important is not the constitutional question of which branch of government has exclusive or complementary jurisdiction over immigration; rather,
it is how the federal government and the states have exercised their respective powers and the specific legal and political structures that they have
created in the process. This will be the focus of the next two sections.

2010) (granting in part and denying in part United States' motion for preliminary injunction).
56. See generally THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL URBAN POLICY (Marshall Kaplan & Franklin J. James eds., 1990).
57. See generally FRUG & BARRON, supra note 38 (arguing that state laws have stifled
urban interests).
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The Legal Limits of Regional Considerations in Immigration Law

Enacted in 1990, the EB-5 immigrant investor visa grants legal permanent residency to an individual who invests and creates jobs in the United
States. 58 The statute requires applicants to make a $1 million capital investment. Soon after it was enacted, the Attorney General exercised its statutory discretion to designate "regional centers" of high unemployment and
economic needs where the investment requirement is lowered to
$500,000. 5' Although passed with bipartisan support and high hopes in
61
Congress, 60 the EB-5 program initially lagged expectations. A recent expansion of the number of regional centers to seventy-four, along with
growing interest by many struggling communities, has led to a spike in EB5 applicants in recent years. 62 Yet, for the most part, the EB-5 program is a
small part of our nation's immigration regime.
The reason I start with this relatively obscure visa program is simple: it
represents the only aspect of our immigration system that explicitly allows
for regional variations and provides for some degree of local input. To be
sure, there are other areas where geography is taken into account. For ex63
ample, both the local resettlement of refugees and the labor certification
required for many employment-based immigration categories' involve
some consideration of regional conditions. Neither of these, however, allows much room for urban policymakers to influence the process. Thus,
for all the different immigration categories that we have and all the different petitioners that can sponsor immigrants, the federal immigration regime
allows almost no room for regional variations, much less a metropolitan
role.
It is no wonder then that urban development strategies centered on immigration have not received more serious consideration. As the law now
stands, such strategies are notoriously hard to implement. Take, for example, the preliminary report recently issued by the New Economic Initiative's Global Detroit Study. After convincingly laying out all the ways
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (2006); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.6 (2010).
59. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(0(2).
60. See Al Kamen, An Investment in American Citizenship; Immigration ProgramInvites Millionairesto Buy Their Way In, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1991, at Al.

61. See Ronald R. Rose, Fixingthe Wheel: A CriticalAnalysis of the ImmigrantInvestor
Visa, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 615, 615-16 (1992).

62. See N.C. Aizenman, Immigrants Invest up to $1 Million in U.S. Visa Program;
Creatingor Preserving10 Jobs is Way to Gain PermanentLegal Status, WASH. POST, Jan.
10, 2010, at A6.
63. The federal government, with the cooperation of religious and other charity organizations, decides where to locate immigrants admitted through the overseas refugee system.
64. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5) (2006).
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immigration can help metropolitan Detroit in terms of economic growth
and neighborhood revitalization, the report was left with the following as
the first three recommendations: making the region more "welcoming" to
immigrants; petitioning the federal government for an EB-5 regional center
designation; and, taking advantage of Canada's immigration laws to convince American businesses to invest in the nearby Canadian city of Windsor. 65 To be sure, some regions have been able to exert more influence
than others. For example, through the strength of its businesses, Silicon
Valley has been influential with respect to visa allocations for skilled
workers. 66 Yet, even with these advantages, it faces an uphill battle: in order to advocate for Silicon Valley and its unique strengths and needs, the
immigration system leaves the region and its businesses no option but to
lobby for a nation-wide change for everyone.
Of course, the thought of the city of Pittsburgh, the greater Los Angeles
metropolitan area, or the state of Iowa setting different immigration requirements or quotas on account of their different needs and interests likely
seems downright unworkable to many, if not outright preposterous. But for
decades, the regional distribution of immigrants occupied federal policymakers more than almost any other issue surrounding immigration.67
Moreover, other countries have started moving in this direction. Canada is
a perfect example. In recent years, it has substantially expanded the involvement and role of provincial government with respect to immigration.
This has included the use of federal-provincial agreements, like the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement, which specifically outlined a role for
municipal involvement in immigration issues. 68 In 1996, Canada introduced the Provincial Nominee Program, in which provinces can negotiate
specific accords with the federal government over the type and number of
immigrants they should receive. 69 It is worth noting that among the provinces that are participating, there are already notable differences: whereas
the Quebec Accord highlights French language skills and is starting to look
into technical workers, Manitoba has used the program to select immigrants
with particular skills to complement its rural economy and is prioritizing
those that it believes are most likely to stay loyal to the region.7" Indeed,
65. TOBOCMAN, supranote 6, at 18-19.
66. See Evelyn Iritani, U.S. Tech Firms, Citing 'Brain Drain,' Push to Hire More
Skilled Foreigners;As More Workers Go to China andIndia,Silicon Valley Seeks a Bigger
Quota on H-1B Visas, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 2006, at Cl.
67. See Su, supra note 51, at 375-77.
68. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD TERRITORIAL REVIEWS: TORONTO, CANADA 2009, at 119-20 (2009).
69. IMMIGRATION TO INTEGRATION, supra note 6, at 83, 127-28.
70. See id.
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one of the most interesting trends in Canadian immigration law is how prothe role of the federal point system as a
vincial criteria are starting to dilute
71
means of selecting immigrants.
C.

Deficiencies in the Structure of Regional Decision-making

As outlined above, the lack of any avenue for geographic variation and
regional control under the current immigration regime is one problem facing an urban policy reorientation of immigration. Even if immigration laws
were altered to account for regional interests and allow for a regional role,
there are still reasons to doubt that metropolitan regions as they are currently constituted will be good at policymaking with respect to immigration
even with their own urban development interests in mind. As should be
clear from Part I, I do not believe this to be a problem inherent in local
governments or urban policymaking. Rather, I consider the problem to be
a consequence of how America's local government laws currently structure
our metropolitan regions.
The reason for my concern over regional decision-making is simple: in
the vast majority of metropolitan regions, there is simply no regional decision-maker. To be sure, most of us live as "citizens of a region." 72 Yet
when we talk about a metropolitan region, we are almost invariably looking
at several political subdivisions: a central city, several different types of
suburbs, 73 and increasingly new communities on the exurban fringe. In this
case, who speaks for the region? It is important to note that this fragmentation is no accident; laws in many states were specifically designed to
achieve this end. 74 Because of this, it might be supposed that states would
be an ideal urban policymaker for regional interests. In most cases, however, the regional context and particular local interests are still too remote
for direct state control. The public authorities that are created by the state
to handle regional issues (power, transportation, water, etc.) are often, by
design, created to be politically unaccountable and operate in a largely administrative manner. 75 This regional structure is not just unwieldy; it also
has consequences for regional development. It is no wonder then that re71. Jason DeParle, Defying Trend, CanadaLures More Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2010, at Al.
72. CALTHORPE & FULTON, supra note 37, at 15.
73. See generally ALAN BERUBE & ELIZABETH KNEEBONE, BROOKINGS INST., Two STEPS
BACK: CITY AND SUBURBAN POVERTY TRENDS 1999-2005 (2006) (noting and describing
suburban diversity, particularly the increase of poor suburbs).
74. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 78 (1990).
75. See generally NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
PRIVATE VALUES INPUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (1994).
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gionalism advocates have been so interested in reforming this structure as a
means of addressing segregation, sprawl, and uneven economic development.76 Yet with limited political success thus far on this front, regional
policymaking continues to be difficult, and as such, not always aligned
with the region's interests as a whole.
When this is combined with the controversial issue of immigration, it is
not uncommon to see political fragmentation and the structure of local government law stifle regional interactions. The integration of a metropolitan
region often means that the benefits of immigration may be enjoyed in one
community, while the costs are incurred in another. 77 Yet, with the lack of
coordination between local government units, each of which has some influence on the fortunes of their neighbors, there is rarely a proper accounting or even dialogue over regional interests or goals. This dilemma is especially evident with respect to local immigration responses to
undocumented immigration. As I observed in North Carolina, many enforcement efforts were defensive reactions to similar actions taken in
78
neighboring jurisdictions, fueling a race-to-the-bottom.
Developments in Arizona offer further illustration. Arizona has recently
drawn national attention with the passage of S.B. 1070, the state's controversial immigration enforcement measure. 79 The situation on the ground,
however, is even more complex. For example, with respect to the metropolitan region such as that surrounding Phoenix, it is worth noting that the
state of Arizona, Maricopa county, and the city of Phoenix all have different interests with respect to immigration and enforcement. The local government structure in the state, however, has discouraged meaningful discussions between these different entities. To prioritize immigration
enforcement, the state passed a bill undermining local control and targeting
localities with different views about the efficacy of enforcement, 80 many
parts of which survived the preliminary injunction issued by the federal
courts against the state. 81 The county sheriffs department, which has con76. See, e.g., COLIN E. GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. Louis AND THE FATE OF THE
AMERICAN CITY 227 (2008).
77. See Laura Koss-Feder, A Slice ofPrices,NEWSDAY, July 14, 2000, at C6.
78. See Rick Su, Commentary, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations,
86 N.C. L. REv. 1619, 1675 (2008).

79. See Rick Su, Commentary, The OverlookedSignificanceofArizona's New Immigration Law, 108 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 76, 76-77 (2010), http://www.michiganlaw
review.org/assets/fi/1 08/su.pdf.
80. See id.
81. Indeed, although the mandatory enforcement provision of S.B. 1070 was enjoined,
many provisions involving state-local relations were left intact because they were outside
the scope of the federal government preemption challenge. Localities are still prohibited
under the law to deprioritize immigration enforcement in any way. Moreover, a locality can
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current jurisdiction with city police departments, has drawn protests and
complaints from city officials for conducting sensational immigration
sweeps in cities like Phoenix and Mesa,8" including a spectacular pre-dawn
armed raid on Mesa's City Hall.83 All the while, without much influence
over state or county actions in their own jurisdiction, cities in Arizona are
turning to the federal government. After the passage of S.B. 1070, Tucson
and Flagstaff made their opposition known by joining a federal lawsuit
challenging the bill. 84 Moreover, in response to the manner in which the
county was conducting its raids in city neighborhoods, the Mayor of Phoenix famously wrote a letter to the Department of Justice asking the federal
government to investigate the county sheriff for civil rights violations
85
committed in the city's own jurisdiction.
In short, if an urban policy reorientation of immigration law ideally
strives to promote regional decision-making initiated by a robust discourse
and meaningful negotiations, and implemented through thoughtful experimentation and forward-looking flexibility, it is a goal that the current local
government law is ill-structured to promote.

III. EMPOWERING IMMIGRATION AS URBAN POLICY: A MODEST
PROPOSAL

The obstacles outlined above do not negate the reasons that exist for reorienting immigration toward urban policy. It does show that any effort to
do so, however, will need to address the lack of any avenue for regional
variation and local control in our immigration regime, and the limitations
of metropolitan policymaking under the existing local government structure. Here, I offer a modest proposal that advances immigration as urban
policy with those obstacles in mind. After setting out the proposal in detail

still be sued for damages by any resident of the state if it does so. As a result, cities have at
best achieved a legal limbo: they are not required to enforce federal immigration laws, but
they are prohibited from taking any steps not to enforce them. See United States v. Arizona,
703 F. Supp. 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (granting in part and denying in part United States' motion
for preliminary injunction).
82. See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Challenges to a Sheriff Both Popularand Reviled,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at A20.
83. See Paul Giblin, Arizona Sheriff Conducts ImmigrationRaid at City Hall,Angering
Officials, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 2008, at A10.
84. See Joe Ferguson, SB1070 Lawsuit to Cost Flagstaffat Least $25,000, ARIZ. DAILY
SUN
(June
2,
2010,
5:00 AM),
http://azdailysun.com/news/local/govt-andpolitics/articlef9403b9f-2525-5efa-b023-cddl 6823116b.html.
85. See Casey Newton & J.J. Hensley, PhoenixMayor Gordon Callsfor FBIInvestigation of Arpaio, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Apr. 13, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/
arizonarepublic/news/articles/0413gordonarpaioO4l3.html. A copy of the letter is available
at http://www.azcentral.com/ic/pdf/arpaio-gordon-2008-investigation-letter.pdf.
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in the first section, I outline some ways in which this proposal can be expanded down the road, and conclude by addressing some of the concerns
that this proposal might raise.
A.

The Proposal

As mentioned earlier, even if cities were inclined to embrace immigration as an urban development strategy, there is still the issue of whether
they have the ability to do so. Of course, there are political and operational
considerations to be taken into account. Yet the basic question is still one
of legal power: how can the law enable metropolitan regions, if they so
wish, to reliably and effectively direct immigration flows into their region?
The manner in which "regional centers" are designated for the purpose of
EB-5 visas can serve as a model. The proposal here, however, recognizes
that the interest in many areas is not merely investment capital, but also the
human capital that immigrants might bring.
A powerful first step would be to allocate H-1B visas according to regional need. H-iBs are "non-immigrant" visas used by employers to re86
cruit foreign skilled labor that does not put them on a path to citizenship.
Because an H-1B visa requires an employer application, is granted with assurances about local labor conditions, and valid only while the visa reci87
pient is employed, there is already a de facto regional component at play.
Rather than relying on employers, however, I propose factoring regional
needs and interests explicitly into its allocation. In other words, the federal
government should allocate these visas geographically in consultation with
the different metropolitan regions. High-immigrant regions fearful of oversupply may request fewer visa allocations going forward, while others like
Silicon Valley (which already receives a large number of such visa holders), may actually lobby for more visas in keeping with their economic development strategy. Similarly, low-immigrant regions with high infrastructural capacity, like Pittsburgh and Cleveland, may seek out large H-iB
allocations not only to attract immigrants and retain more of the international students that pass through their colleges and universities, but also as
a means of enticing employers interested in capitalizing on their visa allocations.
As I have proposed, there are advantages to starting with a nonimmigrant employment-based visa. First, because H-I B visa recipients are
already geographically bound with respect to their place of occupation, no

86. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(i5)(H)(i)(b) (2006).
87. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(t)(1) (2006) (describing labor attestation requirement); see also

8 C.F.R. 214.2(h) (2010).
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additional geographic restrictions are necessary. Of course, since H-i B recipients are allowed under current law to change jobs to another employer
willing to sponsor him or her as an H-lB employee, 88 the initial geographic
restriction might not prove to be a total constraint. Yet rather than changing this aspect of H-1Bs to the detriment of the visa holder, this issue can
be rectified by charging relocations to the visa quota of the receiving region
going forward. This brings us to the second advantage of starting with H1Bs: by focusing on temporary "non-immigrants" and by placing limited
geographic constraints on their ability to move, this proposal largely avoids
constitutional concerns with respect to an immigrant's right to travel to the
89
extent that this right is constitutional rather than statutory.
Yet, even if the proposal can be thought of as "safe" in the manners described above, it is important not to overlook its impact on immigrant settlement for the purposes of urban policy. H-1Bs are one of the largest admission categories; 65,000 visas are allocated each year, and the annual cap
has been set as high as 195,000.90 More importantly, many H-lB visa
holders eventually acquire legal permanent residency. Indeed, it is one of a
few non-immigrant visas where the recipient can admit to having the "dual
intent" of wanting to be a temporary worker and interested in seeking permanent residency. 9' To be sure, my proposal thus far envisions no geographic restrictions on permanent residents, which means that the H-1B visa holders that manage to acquire legal permanent residency would be free
to relocate as they see fit. As the experience of the refugee resettlement
program has shown, however, an initial "nudge" can go a long way with
respect to more enduring settlement pattems. 92 People sink roots, stable
communities form, and investments are made. Moreover, once a critical
mass of a particular immigrant group settles, even if some members eventually leave, others will move in. In this respect, a small change to the allocation of a limited number of visas may change the geography of immi-

88. See 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(2)(i)(D).
89. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1971) (suggesting that any re-

striction on the right to travel by a state is suspect, including those based on immigrant status). It is not clear from Graham, however, whether the same limitations would necessary
apply to restrictions placed by the federal government, given its plenary power over immigration.
90. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(iv) (2006).
91. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(16)(i).
92. For example, while an estimated 6590 Bosnian refugees were settled in St. Louis
from 1993 to 2003, secondary immigration to the St. Louis area has swelled that population
to an estimated 35,000 to 40,000. See Doug Moore, Refugees IncreasinglyFinda Home in
St. Louis, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 31, 2010, at Al; Michele Munz, Festival is a
Sharing of Culture: Area's Large Bosnian Population Celebrates its Heritage, ST. LouiS
POST-DISPATCH,

Sept. 28, 2009, at A3.
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gration settlement and the trajectory of urban development in much larger
ways.
This proposal can be implemented entirely with federal officials making
all the allocation decisions. But to truly integrate immigration into urban
policy agendas, I believe more control should be devolved. A moderate
position would be to set a national cap and an initial regional allocation,
while allowing regions to trade their allocations amongst one another. A
more significant move would be to let metropolitan regions set whatever
allocation they would like and have the national quota reflect the agglomeration of regional quotas. Either way, the reason for stressing a regional
role is to encourage a new approach to how immigration is regulated and
discussed. Local actors have the kind of ground-level awareness that the
federal government lacks; they also have a better sense of the future they
wish to pursue and what role, if any, immigration should play. Moreover,
only with such devolution can we spur the kind of community-bycommunity dialogue regarding the kind of urban policies that will need to
be implemented to complement any given regional immigration strategy.
It is here that my proposal addresses the current limitations of regional
policymaking. More than just devolving discretionary power, the federal
government should also take an active part in structuring the regional body
that will make these decisions. No state or region should be required to
change their governmental structure. There is no need for the federal government to run afoul of the constitutional prohibition against commandeering the legislative process of the states. 93 Yet the federal government can
condition regions that would like to exercise direct control to create or designate a regional entity tasked with this responsibility.9 4 A good model
would be a type of regional council in which all localities are represented
as localities, but membership is apportioned according to a locality's share
93. See United States v. New York, 505 U.S. 144, 161, 175-76 (1992).
94. To be sure, all of this raises concerns about whether the federal government can empower regions or localities specifically without the approval of the state-bypassing the
states, in a sense, by devolving the power directly to metropolitan regions. On the one hand,
the Supreme Court has recognized such devolution as part of the federal government's
preemption powers. See Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 270
(1985). On the other hand, the Court has also expressed doubts about whether, under prevailing local government laws in the United States, the federal government can empower
local governments with authority that the state has never directly delegated or explicitly
withdrawn. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 135-38 (2004). Either way, because my proposal as it now stands is entirely voluntary, states are free to assess whether
they wish to reform their regional structure in order to take advantage of the added control
over immigration. Although I envision regions exercising primary control under my proposal, it is also clear that under our constitutional framework any meaningful local government restructuring, like the creation of regional councils, will almost certainly require state
action.
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of the metropolitan population. 95 Why I propose this rather than a regional
council of at-large representatives or a state appointed commission is twofold. First, regardless of the "accident" of municipal boundaries, people
have strong attachments and identification with their local communities,
which is important to consider in reaching a region-wide policy on immigration.
Second, such a structure will promote manageable conversations at the
local level within a representative structure with which people are already
familiar. On one level, the role of the regional council can be imagined as
simply a mechanism for aggregating all the disparate local preferences. On
another level, however, the regional council may also influence the frame
of the local conversation while making more options available. Knowing
that the final decision will be made on the regional level, residents may
adopt a more regional outlook in expressing their local preferences. Moreover, considering the disparate impacts of immigration on different communities, the regional council may encourage more broad-based inter-local
arrangements. To address concerns in bedroom suburbs about increased
educational and residential service costs, for example, central cities and
business-oriented communities interested in immigration may offer to share
a portion of the growth in their economic tax base. In other regions, it may
be the other way around. Either way, the point is that by devolving limited
but tangible power over immigration, while promoting a more regionaloriented process, the possibilities for urban policy in general are greatly
expanded. Indeed, the immigration incentives might also encourage the
creation of a regional council with an even broader set of responsibilities
than immigration, especially over those aspects of urban policy that are of
importance to a regional (or even national) immigration strategy.
As novel as this aspect of the proposal may sound, it will not be the first
time that the federal government has used legislation and federal incentives
to promote particular local government structures. Indeed, worried about
similar deficiencies in regional decision-making with respect to the administration of federal funding, Congress has in the past mandated and encouraged the creation of regional planning bodies. 96 This included Section 701
of the Housing Act of 1954, which gave federal funding directly to official
regional or metropolitan planning agencies that had to be created to receive
it, and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, which required a "cooperative, comprehensive, and continuous" planning process for metropolitan

95. See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1763, 1791-

92 (2002) (proposing a regional legislature structured in a similar manner, but with a much
broader scope).
96. See FRUG, supranote 47, at 86.
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regions to receive federal funding. 97 Moreover, regional "councils of government"--voluntary alliances of local governments in a regionproliferated in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of a wave of federal legislation. 98 A shift in federal policy with respect to regional planning and urban
development in the 1980s saw many of these measures repealed. 99 Yet
they suggest that federal involvement in the manner proposed is not entirely novel and provide a model for how our immigration regime can be similarly reoriented in this manner.
The purpose of introducing a regional body is not simply to designate a
decision-maker or to assure a particular outcome; it is also to rethink the
process through which immigration decisions can be made. In this respect,
even if limited in choices and constrained in scope, the devolution of real
and substantial policymaking may encourage the kind of grounded and
forward-thinking conversations about immigration that the national debates
currently lack. Rather than trying to wrestle with the future of the United
States as a nation, the question can be easily broken down, region by region, to one more manageable: what is the future of a given community and
what role should immigration play? Mistakes will be made, yet the consequences and stakes will also be clear in this ongoing process. Grounded in
the context of specific regional futures and with an opportunity to make a
real difference, I suspect the choices that are made will ultimately reflect a
now rare mix of cautious pragmatism, moderation, and hopeful aspirations.
B.

Room for Expansion

To recap, I have proposed allocating H-iB visas on a region-by-region
level with the allocation decision to be made by regional councils consisting of the localities in a given metropolitan region. There are good reasons
for starting here. At the same time, there is also no reason to believe that
this is where it needs to end.
Logical next steps may be to look at other employment-based "nonimmigrant" visas. The L visa used for intercompany transfers may be a
good start.100 An even more significant step, however, may be to expand
regional visa allocation beyond skilled immigrants to include low- and unskilled immigrants as well, such as those covered by H-2B visas.10 ' On the

97. AM. PLANNING Ass'N, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES
FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE, 2002 EDITION, at 6-9 (2002), availableat

http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/guidebook/printlpdf/chapter6.pdf.
98. See id. at6-10to-11.
99. See id. at 6-15 to -16.
100. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L) (2006).
101. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).
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one hand, this expansion would reflect the fact that the diversity of most
metropolitan economies means that any urban development strategy would
likely involve assessments of labor demands in the low- and unskilled sectors as well as the highly-skilled. On the other hand, it allows metropolitan
regions that wish to avoid the economic distortions of a shadow economy
of undocumented immigrants, and the disruptions of more intrusive immigration enforcement, the option to expand the legal avenues for unskilled
migrants as an alternative. Considering the critical role that low-skilled
immigrants have played in urbanization in the past, it may be worth allowing such immigrants the possibility of petitioning for legal permanent residency like their H-i B counterparts.
Other than expanding into other visa categories, another direction may
be to expand the role of regional policymaking into other realms of immigration regulation. A good candidate would be interior enforcement.
There is much controversy over the role of local law enforcement officials
with respect to undocumented immigrants. Many fear that local immigration enforcement without federal oversight will lead to abuses.' 0 2 At the
same time, federal immigration enforcement has also been criticized by
state and local officials for being overly aggressive, sensational, and without enough concern for the local communities that are affected. 10 3 To enable federal supervision while also giving local communities a voice, another step may be to mandate regional enforcement agreements to be
10 4
negotiated between the federal government and the regional council.
Certain communities may decide that the benefits of immigration enforcement simply do not outweigh the costs of a particular enforcement strategy.
Others may feel that more aggressive enforcement is necessary, but rather
than focusing on large-scale raids and sweeps, suggest a less disruptive
means toward those ends.
102. See, e.g., Editorial, Showdown in Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2010, at A28.
103. See Abraham, supra note 31; Bernstein, supra note 32; Shulman, supranote 31; Valencia, supra note 32.
104. In contrast to the federal 287(g) program, which allows local law enforcement to be
deputized as federal immigration agents, this proposal is as interested in how regional considerations temper federal enforcement strategies as it is concerned about local assistance to
federal authorities. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)
(2006). To be sure, I have defended the 287(g) program before as a means for localities to
influence federal immigration enforcement strategies. See Su, supra note 78, at 1635-36,
1640-41. Moreover, there are signs of flexibility; just as many cities are signing up to be
deputized as immigration officials under the federal government's 287(g) program, others
are dropping out due to concerns that federal demands endangered rather than enhanced local safety. See Maria Sacchetti, Agencies Halt TheirImmigrantScrutiny BarnstableSheriff,
FraminghamPolice Say No, Bos. GLOBE, Oct. 2, 2009, at Al. Yet in the end, the 287(g)
program still does not allow much local influence to be exercised on the manner in which
federal officials carry out their enforcement responsibilities.
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Finally, an even more flexible and tailored approach to regional immigration policies may be worth considering. Not unlike the provincial accords negotiated between the federal and provincial governments in Canada, a similar set of accords between the federal government and certain
metropolitan regions or states may be worthwhile here. The diversity of
our regions, and their different interests and needs are no less than those of
the Canadian provinces. Rather than being preoccupied with the legality of
immigrants in their community under federal law, states and regions can
take a more active role in deciding what kind of immigrants they would
like to see legally admitted to fill a regional need. It is likely that many
states and regions will express interest in the same kind of immigrants that
currently resort to undocumented entry because no legal option exists. In
addition, emphasizing regional accords will also allow more immigrationrelated issues-from admission categories and enforcement strategies, to
social service responsibilities and education priorities-to be put on the table. Not only would regions and states benefit from this process, but it may
also advance national interests in the long term by allowing the federal
government to develop a network of local partners. Of course, recent
events have conditioned everyone to think of the federal, state, and local
relationship over immigration to be one of inevitable conflict. There is no
reason to believe that a broader cooperative arrangement that gives all the
parties a more active role with respect to their interests will not produce arrangements that advance the interests of all the parties involved.
C.

Addressing Potential Concerns

Of course, while some might be interested in how the initial proposal
can be expanded, others are more likely to raise concerns. Here, I outline a
few possible objections along with a preliminary response.
One concern may be that regional variations will raise the risk of geographic balkanization. The fear would be that some regions will staunchly
oppose all immigration, while other would be eagerly open their doors. To
allow regional control then, would essentially promote a dangerous polarization. This, of course, is of particular concern given America's long tradition of instilling a strong sense of national identity in our immigrant newcomers.
Yet, not only is immigrant distribution already unevenly
concentrated, but I also suspect that few metropolitan regions will be entirely welcoming or entirely exclusive. If anything, the regional control
proposed will likely lead to a more even distribution by giving lowimmigrant regions a way to directly recruit immigrants. Moreover, because
of strong competition over residents and capital among the major metropolitan regions in the United States, it is likely that regional immigration poli-
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cies around the country will always be converging on what is perceived to
be the most successful model. Of course, with many metropolitan regions
focusing their urban development strategy on particular areas of the world
economy-be it Miami and Latin America or Los Angeles and Asia' 5-it
can also be argued that some degree of "specialization" might be worth
promoting.
A second concern may be how devolution affects the balance of interests
and power between the federal government, states, and localities. For
some, it may be that national interests concerning immigration will be undermined under this proposal. For others, the concern might be that even
under the proposed structure, metropolitan policymaking will simply be
poor, especially without substantial federal oversight. With respect to the
first, it is worth noting that incorporating regional variations into our immigration regime may actually increase federal power and control in ways not
possible under the current regime. It is worth recalling that the federal
government has long been interested in the distribution of immigrants and
their settlement, but has had no real avenue to influence that distribution
except through nationwide quotas and restrictions. Moving to federalregional accords can allow the federal government to influence and direct
regional policymaking through the negotiations, especially in ways that are
not currently permitted. With respect to the second concern, it is worth remembering that the proposal envisions a substantial role for federal oversight, both with regard to the type of decisions that regions can make and
the processes through which they do so. Moreover, because the proposal is
based on federal policymaking and not on state rights or local autonomy,
there is always the assurance that truly worrisome developments can be
rectified with further legal refinement at the federal level.
If the first two concerns are that the proposal may be too radical, another
complaint may be that it actually does too little. Some may feel that it does
not do enough to address truly pressing immigration issues, such as undocumented immigration. On the one hand, this is absolutely correct. The
proposal seeks to address what I perceive to be a significant limitation in
our current approach to immigration, but it does not claim to be able to resolve all the immigration controversies, even those that currently dominate
the national discourse, like undocumented immigration. On the other hand,
the potential of an urban policy reorientation of immigration to alter the entire landscape of immigration as an issue of public interest should not be
underestimated. Regional variations in our immigration regime may make

105. See ANDERSSON & ANDERSSON, supra note 4; Franklin J. James et al., The Effect of
Immigration on Urban Communities, 3 CITYSCAPE 171, 182-83 (1998).
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what now seem like national emergencies into a question of what is the optimal geographic distribution and allocation. Indeed, structuring immigration discussions around the concrete models of "city futures" set forth in
Part I may inject much needed substance and meaning into what can sometimes be a vague and unmoored national conversation over immigration
policy. Similarly, regional policymaking may redirect some of the fervor at
the national level towards different forums and discussions framed with a
different set of options and responses. It is too easy today for local leaders
to throw their hands up in frustration and blame the federal government for
failing to fulfill their responsibility. There are concrete actions that urban
policymakers can take to tackle local immigration conflicts and address
immigration-related issues. In this respect, reorienting immigration in this
way and giving regional policymakers some control may also encourage
regional policymakers to play a more active role with respect to immigration in all aspects of urban policy by exercising the power that they already
have. In many of these cases, the reorientation of immigration proposed in
this paper may be the reconceptualization that is needed to finally see many
of immigration's most intractable issues through.
CONCLUSION
Immigration is a national issue and a federal responsibility. Yet, even as
such, there is no reason why it cannot be regulated and discussed with urban policy interests in mind. As this essay has argued, there are good reasons for reorienting a part of our immigration regime towards urban policymaking. To this end, we have looked at the importance of immigration
to urban development in the United States and its usefulness in the pursuit
of various "city futures." We have also examined the local context from
which many immigration controversies spring, the influence of urban policy on our nation's capacity to absorb immigrants, and immigrants' longterm effects on American society. Along with the importance of urban development to our nation's prosperity and the need in our immigration regime for a better means to balance competing demands and varying interests, there are strong reasons for a legal regime that explicitly recognizes
immigration as urban policy.
There are noteworthy obstacles to such a reorientation of our immigration regime, many of which are embedded in the legal structures of immigration and local government law. But as the proposal outlined in Part III
demonstrates, subtle legal reforms, such as how we allocate a particular visa and the process through which that decision is made, can produce significant and meaningful changes in this direction. Though modest, the proposal outlined in this essay may be just the right first step toward a more
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broad-based renegotiation of how regional needs, urban development interests, and local responsibilities can be made a more concrete part of our
immigration regime. At the very least, it should offer a new and more
tangible perspective from which the seemingly intractable controversies
over immigration can be reexamined and approached.

